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University of Kent, UK18
Abstract19
Self-adaptive systems are able to modify their behaviour and/or structure in20
response to changes that occur to the system, its environment, or even its21
goals. In terms of authorisation infrastructures, self-adaptation has shown22
to be a promising solution for enforcing access control policies and subject23
access privileges when mitigating insider threat. This paper describes the24
resilience evaluation of a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure by sim-25
ulating a case study related to insider threats. As part of this evaluation,26
a malicious changeload has been formally defined in order to describe sce-27
narios of abuse in access control. This malicious changeload was then used28
to stimulate self-adaptation within a federated authorisation infrastructure.29
The evaluation confirmed the resilience of a self-adaptive authorisation in-30
frastructure in handling abuse of access under repeatable conditions by con-31
sistently mitigating abuse under normal and high loads. The evaluation has32
also shown that self-adaptation had a minimal impact on the authorisation33
infrastructure, even when adapting authorisation policies while mitigating34
abuse of access.35
Keywords: self-protecting systems, authorisation infrastructures,36
changeload, insider threats, autonomic computing, access control37
1. Introduction38
Self-adaptive systems are able to modify their behaviour and/or struc-39
ture in response to changes that occur to the system, its environment, or40
even its goals [26]. A self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure is a self-41
adaptive system tailored to adapt, at run-time, access control policies and42
their enforcement [30]. An important aspect when evaluating the resilience43
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of a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure is to demonstrate its ability to44
mitigate abuse in access control.45
In this paper, we present a simulation-based approach for evaluating the46
resilience of self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures under repeatable con-47
ditions of system and environmental changes. In our evaluation, in addition48
to observing performance as a measure of success, we also evaluate the im-49
pact of self-adaptation as a means to mitigate potential attacks. Although50
the goal of self-adaptation is to protect dynamically the authorisation infras-51
tructures from attacks, self-adaptation measures may result in undesirable52
states, which may include the loss of access to critical resources.53
For demonstrating the proposed approach, we evaluate the resilience of54
the Self-adaptive Authorisation Framework (SAAF) [3, 4, 6], whose goal is to55
make existing authorisation infrastructures self-adaptable. This is achieved56
by analysing potential attacks once they are detected, and synthesising ap-57
propriate mitigation actions depending on the operating conditions of the58
infrastructure. In terms of SAAF, this would also comprise the generation59
and deployment of new access control policies at run-time, without any hu-60
man interference. The premise is that, an organisation can benefit from the61
properties of dynamic access control without the need to adopt new access62
control models.63
A common way for evaluating self-adaptive systems is through case stud-64
ies [19]. They are used to represent environment and system changes, and65
these are expected to stimulate self-adaptation, thus providing the basis for66
evaluating the impact of adaptation. An advantage of using case studies is67
that changes can be repeated to stimulate self-adaptation scenarios, thus al-68
lowing the evaluation of impact from adaptation in a more consistent way.69
For the evaluation of a self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure, we use a70
fictitious case study describing a set of insider attacks within a federated71
environment. The resilience evaluation of SAAF in a more realistic attack72
scenario was performed using an ethical on-line game to gather insights on73
how SAAF would react towards real malicious behaviour, and how malicious74
users would behave in the presence of self-adaptation [8]. The motivation for75
the study being reported in this paper is to evaluate whether the proposed so-76
lution affects the performance of the overall authorisation infrastructure, and77
to evaluate the effectiveness of the self-adaptive solution to handle malicious78
behaviour.79
This paper provides two key contributions:80
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• the definition of a generic approach for evaluating the resilience of81
self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures. This is demonstrated by82
deploying SAAF within a federated environment, thus showing how83
SAAF handles and mitigates malicious behaviour, in the form of in-84
sider threats, given the existence of non-cooperating third party organ-85
isations;86
• the definition of malicious changeload that drives stimulation of adap-87
tation in response to malicious behaviour (i.e., abuse of access control).88
The usefulness of malicious changeload in providing systematic means89
for specifying repeatable behaviour is demonstrated by evaluating the90
resilience of SAAF under various operational conditions.91
The definition of malicious changeload in the context of self-protecting92
systems extends that of changeload, defined for the resilience evaluation of93
architectural-based self-adaptive systems [12], and which considered faults94
as the only undesirable type of change. In this paper, malicious changeload95
considers the abuse of access control in federated authorisation infrastruc-96
tures. Regarding the resilience evaluation of self-protecting systems, to the97
best of our knowledge this is the first work that uses the notion malicious98
changeload from resilience benchmarking. This is an important concept if99
repeatable conditions of system and environmental changes are necessary in100
the benchmarking of self-protecting systems.101
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present102
some basic concepts related to self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures and103
insider threats. Section 3 positions a motivating case study used as a basis for104
the evaluation. Section 4 specifies the malicious changeload derived from the105
case study. Section 5 describes a set of experiments and results that observes106
the run-time stimulation of malicious changeload, and adaptation of a target107
system. Section 6 reflects on the outcome of the experiments, along with108
the benefits and challenges of self-adaptive authorisation. Related work is109
presented in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, a summary of the paper is110
provided in addition to some insights regarding future work.111
2. Background112
In this background section, we briefly describe the Self-adaptive Autho-113
risation Framework (SAAF) to be used in the resilience evaluation of self-114
adaptive authorisation infrastructures, we provide some insight to insider115
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threats that are representative of malicious behaviour and defined as part of116
malicious changeload, and then we provide a brief introduction to resilience117
benchmark.118
2.1. Self-adaptive Authorisation Framework119
The basis our work is the Self-adaptive Authorisation Framework120
(SAAF), whose goal is to make existing authorisation infrastructures self-121
adaptable [3, 4, 6]. The motivation is that, authorisation infrastructures122
maintained by organisations can benefit from the properties of dynamic ac-123
cess control without the need to adopt new access control models. SAAF is124
based on the MAPE-K feedback loop [24], which monitors the distributed125
services of an authorisation infrastructure, and builds a model of the whole126
system at run-time (i.e., deployed access control rules, assigned subject privi-127
leges, and protected resources). Malicious user behaviour observed by SAAF128
is mitigated through the generation and deployment of access control policies129
at run-time, preventing any identified abuse from continuing. Adaptation at130
the model level ensures that abuse can no longer continue. In addition, model131
transformation supports the generation of access control policies from an ab-132
stract access model. This enables the generation and deployment of policies133
that are specific to different implementations of access control.134
Figure 1 presents a conceptual design of SAAF in which the services of the135
authorisation infrastructure, and their interactions, are represented as solid136
lines, while the autonomic controller and its interactions are represented as137
dash lines. The role of the SAAF controller is to monitor and adapt the138
services of the authorisation infrastructure. The interactions between the139
services are annotated with a sequence of events, and as it can be observed,140
the autonomic controller does not affect the sequence of events related to141
the functionality of the identity and authorisation services. The autonomic142
controller affects only the properties associated these services, respectively,143
identities and policies, as a means to mitigate malicious behaviour. A major144
challenge while implementing SAAF is that no single service provides a com-145
plete view of access control in terms of what users own in access rights, what146
access control rules exist, and finally, how users are utilising access rights.147
Figure 2 presents a detailed design of the SAAF controller. The SAAF148
controller comprises the analysis, which generates new access control mod-149
els, and the plan, which selects the most appropriate access control model150
amongst the valid ones. For each identified attack, the SAAF controller se-151
































Figure 1: SAAF conceptual design
on the type of attack and current access control model. At deployment-time,153
the SAAF controller is loaded with a set of predefined solutions that mitigate154
malicious events. The solutions match a finite set of actions that can be per-155
formed within the application domain, and are parametric in order to tailor156
the solutions to specific cases of insider attacks. Given a detected attack, a157
solution is selected from the following alternatives: 1) increasing, limiting or158
removing access rights owned by an individual, 2) increasing or limiting the159
scope of access defined by access control rules, 3) warning the individual(s)160
of their behaviour, and 4) monitoring the behaviour further. Associated with161
each solution there is a potential impact. Depending on the type of action162
invoked, it can cause either negligible or severe consequences to the system163
(which may be warranted given the severity of the attack detected). Which164
solution is selected depends on how severe the SAAF controller deems the165
identified malicious behaviour to be. For example, what is the number of166
non malicious users impacted negatively by the solution (thus losing access167
to resources). High severity may be justified for cases when many users are168
identified as being malicious in relation to specific resources or roles. In169
this cases, changing access control rules provides a more effective means to170
responding to attacks.171
In its current form, SAAF ensures that whatever adaptations take place172
will not break conformance to the service’s implemented access control173
methodology - in our case Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC), nor174
conflict with application domain requirements (e.g., ensure access to busi-175






























Figure 2: SAAF controller design
referred as LDAP [25], which is a directory service commonly used to hold177
information (including user roles) about users within an organisation. To178
generate ABAC access control decisions, based on roles owned by users, we179
use a standalone service authorisation service, known as PERMIS [16].180
2.2. Insider Threats181
Insider threat refers to an organisation’s risk of attack by their own users182
or employees [13]. This is particularly relevant to access control, where the183
active management of authorisation has the potential to mitigate and prevent184
users from abusing their own access rights to carry out attacks.185
A common characteristic of insider threat is that malicious insiders use186
their knowledge of their organisation’s systems, and their assigned access187
rights, to conduct attacks. This places a malicious insider in a fortuitous188
position, whereby the insider (as an authorised user) can cause far greater189
damage than an external attacker, simply due to their access rights [14].190
Such form of attack is representative of the attacks that many organisations191
consider to be most vulnerable from: the abuse of privileged access rights by192
the employees of an organisation [34]. Unless additional measures are put193
into place, malicious insiders can abuse existing security measures, where194
current approaches fail to robustly adapt and respond to the unpredictable195
nature of users. Whilst there are a number of novel techniques that enable196
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the detection of insider threat [22, 32, 38], there is little research that uses197
such techniques within an automated setting, like our proposed approach198
that relies on self-adaptation.199
2.3. Resilience Benchmarking200
A benchmark is a standard procedure that allows characterising and com-201
paring systems or components according to specific characteristics (e.g., per-202
formance, dependability) [23]. Previous work on computer benchmarking can203
be divided in three main areas: performance benchmarking [20], dependabil-204
ity benchmarking [23], and security benchmarking [27].205
In the context of self-protecting systems, resilience benchmarking rep-206
resents a step further since it needs to consider system and environment207
dynamics, although it is bound to encompass techniques from these previ-208
ous efforts due to its inherent relation to performance, dependability and209
security. Given an application domain (that specifies the target systems210
and its environment), a resilience benchmark should provide generic ways211
for characterising system behaviour in the presence of changes, allowing to212
compare similar systems quantitatively. If a system is effective and efficient213
in accommodating or adjusting to changes, avoiding successful attacks as214
much as possible and operating as close as possible to its defined goals, it215
is reasonable to consider the system to be resilient. This capability can be216
benchmarked by submitting the system to various types of changes, time and217
resources dedicated to mitigate them, as well as, the impact of this process218
in the fulfilment of the system goals. As the changes affecting the system219
may lead to the degradation of its performance, without leading necessarily220
to security breaches, we need to assess variations in the properties of inter-221
est when the system is under varying environmental conditions, in order to222
characterise its behaviour from a resilience perspective.223
3. Case Study: LGZLogistics224
Given the challenges in obtaining detailed data on actual cases of insider225
threats, this fictitious case study draws upon several historical cases dis-226
cussed in the CERT guide to insider threat [13]. In this paper, we consider227
data theft attacks that are performed to a fictitious logistics company, called228
LGZLogistics, representing a service provider and identity provider within a229
federated authorisation infrastructure. Malicious behaviour is conducted by230
disgruntled employees of the logistics company, as well as employees of an231
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external Trusted Business Partner (TBP) [13]. The role of a TBP is key to232
this case study, as it is representative of the relationship a service provider233
organisation has with an identity provider organisation (e.g., LGZLogistics234
trusts the TBP to provide IT help desk services).235
The case study focuses on two areas of insider threat that organisations236
are highly vulnerable to: the abuse of user access rights by employees of the237
organisation, and the abuse of access rights by TBP organisations [34].238
3.1. Context and Architecture239
LGZLogistics portrays a small to medium sized company of 1000 employ-240
ees, ten of which are IT staff that support and administer a set of protected241
resources. These resources are protected via an instantiated Attribute Based242
Access Control (ABAC) model, in the form of subject attribute assignments243
within identity services, and an access control policy within an authorisation244
service.245
Figure 3: LGZLogistics authorisation infrastructure architecture
LGZLogistics maintains a SimpleSAML.php [37] identity service lgzIS to246
authenticate its subjects (employees), and issue access rights (as credentials).247
The organisation also maintains a PERMIS standalone authorisation service248
as [36], to authorise subject access to its resources. These resources include249
an employee database empDB, and a bespoke logistics tool lgT. The em-250
ployee database contains personnel information about the logistic company’s251
employees, which is required for general IT help desk enquires.252
LGZLogistics uses the authorisation service as to authorise access for its253
own subjects, as well as subjects from a second offshore contractor organ-254
isation (a TBP). LGZLogistics trusts the contractor organisation to issue255
access rights to their subjects, as part of a business contract for providing256
IT help desk services. As such, the contractor organisation also operates257
a SimpleSAMLphp identity service conIS that manages its own employees’258
access rights to the requesting service providers (i.e., LGZLogistics). As part259
of their contract, subjects from the contractor organisation are permitted ac-260
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cess to empDB to facilitate help desk duties. Access for subjects from either261
identity service is obtained as follows:262
1. A subject attempts to perform an action on a resource;263
2. The resource enacts a policy enforcement point (PEP) that requires the subject to264
authenticate with their identity service (i.e., lgzIS or conIS);265
3. Upon authentication, a short term credential is released to the resource’s PEP,266
denoting a signed set of subject attributes (e.g., a SAML assertion [33]);267
4. The PEP forwards the subject’s issued credential to the authorisation service as,268
which validates the contents of the credential to ensure attributes released have269
been issued by a trusted identity provider;270
5. If valid, the attributes are used to request access via the authorisation service as;271
along with the resource, and action to be performed.272
6. Lastly, the authorisation service as decides whether to grant access in accordance273
to its authorisation policy.274
3.2. Access Control Model275
LGZLogistics employ an ABAC methodology to protect its resources. As276
such, an instantiation of ABAC considers the subjects of LGZLogistics and277
the subjects of the contractor organisation. Each set of subjects have a278
permissible scope of access rights that can be assigned to them.279
Figure 4 defines access in the form of a class diagram. There are five280
‘permisRole type’ attributes [15] (specific to the PERMIS standalone au-281
thorisation service) with corresponding values. Subjects are assigned these282
attributes, which can then be used to invoke permissions.283
In addition to the subject attribute assignments and attribute284
permission assignments, LGZLogistics define a set of valid at-285
tribute assignment rules (within its authorisation policy). Figure 5286
specifies what attributes an identity provider is trusted to issue287
on behalf of its employees. For example, LGZLogistics identity288
provider lgzIS is trusted to assign attributes 〈permisRole, SysAdmin〉,289
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉, and 〈permisRole, Staff〉 to its employees. The290
contractor organisation identity provider conIS can only assign attributes291
〈permisRole, ContractorSupervisor〉 and 〈permisRole, Contractor〉.292
3.3. Subject Behaviour293
This section identifies typical subject behaviour for the day to day oper-294
ations of LGZLogistics, as well as a malicious behaviour scenario.295
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Figure 4: LGZLogistics subject attribute permission assignments
Figure 5: LGZLogistics valid attribute assignments
3.3.1. Typical Behaviour296
The following describes a base line of subject behaviour, detailing the297
average usage of the authorisation infrastructure likely to occur in the day298
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to day operations of LGZLogistics :299
• Each staff member requests ‘access’ to the lgT resource on average two times per300
day;301
• Contractors receive on average fifty calls per day, each call requiring one ‘read’302
access to empDB;303
• On average, one in five calls require access to ‘modify’ the empDB, which can only304
be performed by a contractor supervisor, systems analyst, or system administrator;305
• On average, each system analyst performs ten ‘read’ requests, and five ‘modify’306
requests per day to the empDB;307
• A system admin performs on average one ‘read’, ‘modify’, ‘delete’, and ‘create’308
request per day to the empDB.309
3.3.2. Malicious Behaviour Scenario310
The logistics company is victim of an insider attack, largely as a result311
of a catalyst event [32]. The catalyst event refers to a notification to several312
key IT workers that they have been selected for job redundancy 1.313
A systems analyst that has been selected for redundancy is unhappy about314
the decision, and attempts to damage the company in three ways. The first is315
to attack the empDB resource by randomly corrupting employee records, in-316
voking the permission ‘modify’ empDB. The second is an attempt to disrupt317
access to the lgT resource, essentially flooding the resource by initiating nu-318
merous authorised sessions. The final attempt is socially motivated, whereby319
the analyst, who works closely with employees of the contractor organisation,320
informs them that LGZLogistics is going to cancel their contract to cut costs.321
A contractor supervisor, now fearing job redundancy, decides to steal322
data from the empDB resource. The supervisor has links with the internet323
underground [13], and is aware of anonymous buyers looking for data fit for324
identify theft. By persuading his peers, three other contractors decide to325
collaborate in stealing employee information from the empDB, to sell it to326
the internet underground.327
4. Specification of Malicious Changeload328
In this section, we define the changeload related specifically to malicious329
behaviour in the context of authorisation infrastructures. Essentially, it ap-330
1Instead of generalising an attack as being “harmful”, the labelling of an attack in the
context of a case study is fundamental for specifying a meaningful malicious changeload.
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plies Cámara et al.’s definitions of a changeload model [12] (which is spe-331
cific to architectural-based self-adaptation) to authorisation infrastructures.332
Cámara et al.’s changeload model was chosen in order to concretely define333
the scope of change within an authorisation infrastructure.334
Cámara et al. formulated their changeload model primarily to classify335
system and environment changes that stimulate adaptation [12]. They have336
defined changeload as a set of change scenarios that demonstrates changes,337
which are: valid within a conventional operational profile, invalid thus stim-338
ulating adaptation, or as the result of adaptation.339
A malicious changeload, in the context of authorisation infrastructures,340
drives stimulation of adaptation in response to the abuse of access control341
(i.e., places a system into a non-conventional operational state). It is consid-342
ered that both environment and system stimulation are capable in generat-343
ing non-conventional operational states (and are often a by-product of each344
other), whereby environment change leads to system change.345
4.1. System and Environment Models346
For the specification of system and the environment properties, we need347
to define, respectively, the system model and environment model. These348
models enable the specification of system properties that describe an autho-349
risation infrastructure’s run-time parameters and workload, and environment350
properties that characterise the operational conditions imposed on an autho-351
risation infrastructure. The properties contained in both system and envi-352
ronment models are dependent on a given deployment of an authorisation353
infrastructure and its protected resources.354
The LGZLogistics authorisation infrastructure is formally defined in355
terms of an architecture model (Figure 6). For SAAF, on the other hand,356
the access control model provides the relations between components of an357
architectural model (i.e., how a subject of an identity service component358
can access a resource component). Despite this, the use of an architectural359
model is beneficial for defining properties of a system and the environment.360
It enables the specification of system properties that describe an authori-361
sation infrastructure’s run-time parameters and workload, and properties of362
the environment that characterises the operational conditions imposed on363
an authorisation infrastructure. These properties are said to be contained364
within a system model and environment model, derived from the architecture365
model.366
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Figure 6: Example architecture model for an authorisation infrastructure.
Example 1. Figure 6 displays an architecture model of the LGZL-367
ogistics authorisation infrastructure, where the set of architectural types368
is T ={IdentityServiceT ,AuthorisationServiceT ,ResourceT}. Examples of369
system properties include Γsys(AuthorisationServiceT )={policy,sub access rate}.370
Examples of environment properties (displayed inside the grey boxes) include371
Γenv(AuthorisationServiceT )={sub access req rate, lgT access request rate},372
and Γenv(ResourceT )={activeSessions,latency}.373
4.2. System and Environment State374
The system state captures the value of system properties and the execu-375
tion of services at a given moment in time. For example, the authentication376
of subjects, the release of subject attributes, the validation of subject at-377
tributes, and the authorisation of subject access.378
Example 2. In this example, two system attributes are identified that denote379
execution of the authorisation infrastructure: (i) rate of attribute releases (of380
any kind) from the identity service lgzIS, and (ii) rate of successful read re-381
quests per interval to empDB. For typical execution of the identity service382
lgzIS, there is a constant throughput of one attribute release per minute. For383
typical execution of the authorisation service as, there is a constant through-384
put of three successful access decisions to empDB.385
• A = 〈lgzIS.sub attr release rate, as.empDB read rate〉386
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• B = 〈constant function, constant function〉387
• VA = 〈1, 3〉388
• VB = 〈θlgzIS(t) = 1/min, θas(t) = 3/min〉389
The environment state captures operational conditions of external sys-390
tems and users that interact with the authorisation infrastructure. This in-391
cludes conditions, such as, the rate of access requests by subjects, or number392
of active sessions in resources. Building a perception of environment state is393
essential to identifying states that exhibit malicious behaviour (e.g., subjects394
exhibiting excessive deviation from normal activity).395
Example 3. In this example, three environment attributes are identified that396
denote operational conditions: (i) the number of active sessions in empDB,397
(ii) the rate of authentication requests made by all subjects against the iden-398
tity service lgzIS, and (iii) the rate of access requests to access the resource399
empDB to authorisation service as. The values associated with these opera-400
tional conditions are, respectively, five active sessions, a throughput of one401
authentication requests per minute, and a throughput of three access requests402
per minute.403
• A = 〈empDB.active sessions, lgzIS.sub authentications req rate,404
as.empDB read req rate〉405
• B = 〈constant function, constant function, constant function〉406
• VA = 〈5, 1, 3〉407
• VB = 〈θempDB(t) = 5, θlgzIS(t) = 1/min, θas(t) = 3/min〉408
4.3. Operational Profiles409
An authorisation infrastructure can be in one of two types of states, a410
conventional operational state, or non-conventional operational state [12]. A411
conventional operational state refers to a state where there is no ongoing412
abuse of access rights.413
Example 4. A conventional operational profile is described as a set of states414
that does not contain any known patterns of abuse of access (i.e., violations).415
COP = {s ∈ S | s |= ¬(empDBV iolation)}416
A violation describes a predicate, that if true, denotes malicious behaviour417
within the environment state.418
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A non-conventional operational state refers to a state where there is on-419
going abuse of access rights.420
Example 5. A non-conventional operational profile is described as a set of421
states that contain one or more occurrences of malicious behaviours. In this422
case, a violation (empDBViolation) denotes a specific violation in access to423
the empDB.424
NCOPempDBV iolation = {s ∈ S | s |= empDBV iolation}425
The violation empDBViolation is focused on determining if any particular426
subject is requesting access to the empDB resource in a rapid manner. A427
subject that requests access to empDB at a rate (subAccessReqRateempDB)428
greater than a maximum prescribed rate (maxSubAccessReqRateempDB) is429
considered to be malicious.430
empDBV iolation = subAccessReqRateempDB > maxSubAccessReqRateempDB431
4.4. Change Types and Changes432
Change types affect either identity services or authorisation services,433
which are characterised as part of an authorisation infrastructure, or its envi-434
ronment, consisting mainly of protected resources. Change types are defined435
as a vector of ‘attributes’ 2 that describe a change and the dynamics of a436
change.437
In application to authorisation infrastructures, a change type describes an438
observable event within identity services, authorisation services, or protected439
resources. Essentially, the observation of such change will have a consequence440
on properties contained within the system and environment model.441
Example 6. In the following, several examples of low level environment442
change types are exemplified, depicting the process of a subject requesting443
access to a resource. The instantiation of these change types will have a444
consequence on one or more environment properties.445
2Note that the domain of authorisation infrastructures refer to ‘attributes’ as a piece of
information that expresses something about the subject or the current conditions within
an accessed resource. This is not to be confused with attributes of a formal model of
change (i.e., changeload).
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(i) Authentication request type captures (within an identity service)446
the identity service receiving a request for authentication of a user.447
auth request type = 〈identity service,
〈authRequest(username, password)〉,
〈event〉〉
(ii) Attribute release request type captures a request received by the448
identity service made by a service provider for a subject’s identity at-449
tributes.450
attr release request type = 〈identity service,
〈attrRequest(identity,
〈iAttribute type1, ..., iAttribute typen〉, target)〉,
〈event〉〉
identity = 〈identity type, identity value〉
It describes the request of a service provider (target) for a set of identity451
attributes (iAttribute type) that have been issued to a subject (identity).452
The set of attributes requested can be a null set, therefore requesting all453
releasable attribute types for the subject identity. Note that an identity is454
referred to by a type of identifier and a value. For example, identity type455
may be an LDAP distinguished name.456
(iii) Credential validation request type is the receipt of a credential457
validation request within an authorisation service.458
cred validation request type =
〈auth service,
〈valRequest(identity, issuer, 〈iCondition1, ..., iConditionn〉,
〈iAttribute1, ..., iAttributen〉)〉,
〈event〉〉
It contains attributes issued by a given identity provider (issuer) for a459
requesting subject, detailing a request to validate a subject’s attributes.460
A set of conditions specified by the issuer can also be contained, whereby461
a condition refers to a type / value tuple, such as a single use declara-462
tion, or validity time. A credential validation request can either push463
the subject’s known attributes, or (given a null set) require the autho-464
risation service to pull the subject’s known attributes from the subject’s465
identity provider. In the latter case, the authorisation service invokes466
an attribute release request.467
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(iv) Access request type is the request, received by an authorisation ser-468
vice, and made by a resource on behalf of a subject.469
access request type = 〈auth service,
〈accessRequest(〈iAttribute1, ..., iAttributen〉, resource,
action, 〈rAttribute1, ..., rAttributen〉, identity)〉,
〈event〉〉
iAttribute = 〈iAttribute type, iAttribute value〉
rAttribute = 〈rAttribute type, rAttribute value〉
The request contains 1) the subject’s identity attributes (iAttribute), 2)470
the resource and action to be carried out by the subject, 3) a set of471
resource environment attributes (rAttribute) provided by the resource472
(e.g., 〈timeOfDay type, 11am〉), and 4) the requesting subject’s iden-473
tity.474
(v) Resource action step type models an action that has occurred within475
any protected resource. The type is generic as resources are generally476
unique to the organisation and their purpose, unlike with an authorisa-477
tion service type that exists to fulfil access control requirements.478
resource action step type = 〈resource,
〈rAttribute〉,
〈step function〉〉
The type identifies an attribute modification by means of a step function.479
The attribute modified (rAttribute) is a tuple of type / value, and can480
represent anything modelled within the resource type, be it generic or481
specific. For example, this type could be instantiated to increase the total482
amount of bandwidth consumed by a subject, within a given session.483
Example 7. In the following, several examples of system change types are484
described, conveying the system’s response to a subject requesting access.485
(i) Authentication decision type captures the consequence (within an486
identity service) of an authentication request being responded to.487
auth decision type = 〈identity service,
〈authDecision(auth request)〉,
〈event〉〉
(ii) Attribute release type is the consequence of an attribute release re-488
quest, within an identity service.489
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attr release type = 〈identity service,
〈attrRelease(attr release request)〉,
〈event〉〉
attrRelease(attr release request) = 〈issuer, identity,
〈iCondition1, ..., iConditionn〉
〈iAttribute1, ..., iAttributen〉〉
It details the releasable identity attributes (iAttribute) as a tuple stating490
the type of identity attribute and its value. Identity attributes are re-491
leased along with the issuer of the attributes (i.e., an ID of the identity492
provider or individual whom assigned these attributes), the identity of493
the subject (i.e., a persistent ID), and a set of conditions. Conditions494
are a type value tuple, detailing the use of the released attributes. For495
example, a condition may assert the released attributes may only be used496
once, or can only be used in a given time frame.497
(iii) Credential validation type is the consequence of a credential vali-498
dation request, within an authorisation service.499
cred validation type = 〈auth service,
〈valCredentials(cred validation request)〉,
〈event〉〉
valCredentials(cred validation request) =
〈viAttribute1, ..., viAttributen〉
It returns valid attributes (viAttributei) for a subject if the provided500
iAttributes conform to the authorisation service’s credential validation501
policy. These are effectively the same as identity attributes, however,502
they are referred to as valid because an authorisation service has checked503
that the identity service is trusted to issue them.504
(iv) Access decision type is the consequence of an access request, provid-505
ing a decision based on the attributes within an access request, and an506
authorisation service’s access control policy.507
access decision type = 〈auth service, 〈accessDecision(access request)〉,
〈event〉〉
accessDecision(access request) = decision
A change is an instantiation of a change type. Once enacted, the percep-508
tion of state (either system or environment) has changed.509
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Example 8. In this example, the environment change types, provided in Ex-510
ample 6, are instantiated into actual changes relevant to the LGZLogistics511
case study.512
(i) Authentication request change defines the attributes received as part513
of a request for authentication within identity provider lgzIS.514
emp0003 auth request = (auth request type, lgzIS,
〈authRequest(emp0003, password)〉,
〈event〉, 1373463234, 0)
(ii) Attribute release request change could be requested by a resource’s515
policy enforcement point at the time of authentication. However, it is516
also used by authorisation services as part of a credential validation517
request (depending on its configuration). The request states a set of518
identity attribute types (i.e., attribute types that can exist with an iden-519
tity, such as e-mail), and an identity. The identity, shown as a set520
of numerical and alphabetical characters, is a privacy protected persis-521
tent id (PID), however, equally could denote a non-privacy protected522
identifier (e.g., an e-mail address).523
emp0003 permisRole request =




(iii) Credential validation request524
emp0003 cred validation request =






This change portrays a credential validation request being received in525
authorisation service as. A privacy protected identity is provided,526
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along with the authenticating identity service (lgzIS), in order for527
the authorisation service as to validate the subject’s released attribute528
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉. The two conditions (notOnOrBefore,529
notOnOrAfter) state the validity of the released attribute.530
(iv) Access request change captures the subject emp0003, with531
assigned identity PID: bxu915810faa4910 and attribute532
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉, requesting to execute ‘read’ action on533
the resource empDB (Payroll service). The change is observed as the534
receipt of request within the authorisation service as.535
emp0003 empDB request =





(v) Resource action step is a change that increments the total bandwidth536
the subject emp0003 has used within an active session, specifically, to537
the empDB resource. This change indicates a step change to the at-538
tribute activeSessions[emp0003].bandwidth, which contains the subject’s539
current used bandwidth for their active session; the change increases540
200kb bandwidth to 800kb.541
incr emp0003 empDB bandwitdh =
(resource action step type, empDB,
〈200kb〉,
〈θempDB(t) = activeSessions[emp0003].bandwidth+ 600kb〉,
1373465245, 0)
Example 9. This example provides instantiations of the system change542
types identified in Example 7. An instantiation of a change type is defined543
as (change type, srcinst, VA, VB, time, duration).544
(i) Authentication decision change indicates the subject emp0003 au-545
thenticating themselves against the identity service lgzIS, which is clas-546
sified by an event. The change is coupled with the attributes of the re-547
quest, in order to provide the decision. The decision generates a grant548
and the generation of a new session for the subject within the lgzIS549
identity service.550
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authDecision(emp0003 auth request) = success
(ii) Attribute release change indicates a change observed at the lgzIS551
identity service, where a resource empDB has requested the attribute552
release of attribute type ‘permisRole’ of the subject emp0003. Iden-553
tity service lgzIS releases a tuple of attributes that match the request554
from the resource for the required subject. In this case, it releases555
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉. The time indicates the time and date of556
the attribute release, and as this is not associated to any session, the557
duration is instant (0).558
emp0003 permisRole release =




attrRelease(emp0003 permisRole request) =
〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉
(iii) Credential validation change indicates a change observed within the559
authorisation service as, being a credential validation. Credential val-560
idation either validates the provided attributes in the request, or pulls561
the subject’s attributes from the identity provider. In this example, the562
authorisation service has validated the pushed attributes, asserting that563
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉 is valid.564
emp0003 cred validation =
(cred validation type, as,
〈valCredentials(emp0003 cred validation request)〉,
〈event〉,
1373463240, 0)
valCredentials(emp0003 cred validation request) =
〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉
(iv) Access decision change indicates the authorisation servic as receiv-565
ing a request and generating an authorisation decision based on the566
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attributes of the request. The authorisation service has granted the re-567
quest. The change is instant and is only relevant for the specific request,568
therefore there is no duration.569




accessDecision(emp0003 empDB request) = permit
4.5. Scenarios and Changeload570
A scenario encompasses a set of changes over time, in light of a set of571
system goals, and a given state. It is used to formally describe malicious572
behaviour over time, such as a progression of violations. Key to a scenario573
is the definition of goals that should be fulfilled as the system undergoes574
change. In relation to detecting and mitigating malicious behaviour, a goal575
may refer to an error margin in detecting attacks, maximum response time576
to resolving attacks, and impact of attacks before required policy changes.577
A base scenario defines a state that conforms to a system’s conven-578
tional operational profile, i.e., a state where no known malicious behaviour579
is present. Such an assumption requires that only malicious behaviour in-580
tended to be stimulated against the base scenario can be evaluated, as it is581
not possible to rule out the existence of unknown malicious behaviour. The582
LGZLogistics case study has several valid base scenarios. For example, a583
base scenario could describe the typical workload during a normal business584
day within LGZLogistics. This includes a typical definition of criteria and585
assignment of access. Alternatively, it could represent the initial deployment586
of its authorisation infrastructure (i.e., no workload).587
Example 10. A base scenario for the LGZLogistics case study portrays the588
authorisation infrastructure, and its expected system and environment proper-589
ties, for a typical work day. For simplicity, only the system and environment590
properties relating to subject access are described. DailyAccess captures a591
base scenario of a typical system state relating to access decisions, and a592





state, Gf , ∅)594
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Each element of the base scenario tuple is expressed below. The system595
state combines properties that indicate the run-time parameters of services596
(e.g., authorisation policies), as well as system workload properties (e.g., rate597
of permitted access for a given subject). Both the system and environment598
states are defined in conformance to LGZLogistic’s access control model (Sec-599




〈constant function, constant function, constant function,
constant function, constant function〉,
〈AP1, {Staff, SysAnalyst}, {Contractor}, 0.6, 1.25〉,
〈θas.policy(t) = AP1, θas(emp0003.permisRole) = {Staff, SysAnalyst},
θas(con0003.permisRole) = {Contractor}, θas(t) = 0.6/min,
θas(t) = 1.25/min〉
〉
SysAccesststate defines the state of access control, including policies and601
attribute assignments. For example, subject emp0003 from identity service602
lgzIS, is assigned attributes 〈permisRole, {Staff, SysAnalyst}〉. AP1 de-603
notes a PERMIS authorisation policy that implements the valid attribute as-604
signment rules in Figure 5, and attribute permission assignments in Figure 4.605
Note, the system state defined is not exhaustive, rather it focuses only on:606
system properties that define the current state of access; provides an exam-607
ple of attribute assignment to a subject from each identity provider; and an608








〈constant function, constant function, constant function
constant function, constant function, constant function
constant function, constant function, constant function
contstant function〉,
〈0.8, 0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 4.8, 1.6, 6.7, 6.7, 3.8, 20.0〉,
〈θas(t) = 0.8/min, θas(t) = 0.4/min, θas(t) = 0.2/min, θas(t) = 0.2/min,
θas(t) = 4.8/min, θas(t) = 1.6/min, θas(t) = 6.7/min,
θas(t) = 6.7/min, θas(t) = 3.8/min, θas(t) = 20.0/min〉
〉
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EnvReqststate defines the state of the environment with regards to sub-610
jects requesting access. The environment properties identified in the state611
condition refer to collective behaviour per attribute per permission. For612
example, for subjects requesting access to ‘read’ empDB, with attribute613
〈permisRole, SysAdmin〉, a rate of 0.8 requests per minute is observed. As614
there are two subjects with this attribute (Figure 4), it is assumed that each615
subject has an average rate of 0.4 requests per minute (i.e., one request every616
150 seconds).617
The fixed goals (Gf ) define the conditions that must be maintained within618
the authorisation infrastructure, regardless of change. Ultimately, a goal re-619
quires a system to be brought out of a non-conventional operational state620
(once identified). However, goals also focus on a wider scope of conditions621
that attempt to ensure that only necessary adaptations are taken, once in a622
non-conventional state. The following describes a set of goals relevant to the623
LGZLogistics case study:624
• Probability of 99% that all instances of known violation types are de-625
tected;626
• Probability of 90% that violations are mitigated through subject adap-627
tation;628
• Probability of 99% that all adaptations performed exhibit a lower cost629
than current and unmitigated violations, to the organisation.630
Probabilities cited are pseudo values that indicate LGZLogistics requirements631
for mitigation. However, an accurate probability can only be achieved through632
rigorous benchmarking of the scenario in an off-line environment [10]. In633
any case, probabilities defined are specific to the deployment environment,634
and configuration of the authorisation infrastructure.635
Cámara et al. state that a change scenario represents a set of changes636
applied to a base scenario [12]. As such, a change scenario instantiates a set637
of changes within the authorisation infrastructure when it is in a particular638
state. Through the application of change scenarios, it is expected to bring639
the authorisation infrastructure into an non-conventional state, where the640
authorisation infrastructure’s fixed goals can be evaluated.641
Example 11. The following sequence of changes describes subject emp0003642
accessing the empDB resource.643
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c1 = (access request type, as, 〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = bxu915810faa4910)〉, 〈event〉, 5, 0)
c2 = (access request type, as, 〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = bxu915810faa4910)〉, 〈event〉, 10, 0)
c3 = (access request type, as, 〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = bxu915810faa4910)〉, 〈event〉, 15, 0)
c1 describes a single access request for emp0003, identified644
by privacy protected id (PID) bxu915810faa4910, using attribute645
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉, to access empDB. Thereafter, at 5 second646
intervals, new changes are instantiated, whereby the request for access to647
empDB is repeated. As a result, the subject affects a number of environment648
properties associated to the system, namely, the subject’s rate of access to649
empDB.650
The sequence of changes describes a rapid rate of access to the empDB651
resource (labelled as CrapidAccess). With the sequence of changes defined, it is652




state, Gf , CrapidAccess)655
CrapidAccess = {c1, c2, c3}656
Cámara et al. formulated their changeload model primarily to classify657
system and environment change that stimulates adaptation. As such, a ma-658
licious changeload, in the context of authorisation infrastructures, is one that659
drives stimulation of adaptation in response to the abuse of access control660
(i.e., places a system into a non-conventional operational state). It is consid-661
ered that both environment and system stimulation are capable in generat-662
ing non-conventional operational states (and are often a by-product of each663
other), whereby environment change leads to system change.664
4.6. Violations665
A set of violations are defined as the upper bounds of abnormal behaviour,666
based on the normal behaviour described in the LGZLogistics case study. It is667
assumed that historical data of subject behaviour (if present), coupled with668
an expert approach, is used to define relevant violations. With reference669
to the Self-Adaptive Authorisation Framework (SAAF), each violation is670
defined as a trigger rule (with an associated cost).671
The following violations detail patterns of access against LGZLogistic’s672
resources, regarding short term and long term rates of access invoking certain673
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permissions. For each violation a maximum rate of access is defined, whereby674
a short term rate refers to subject access within a minute interval, and a long675
term rate refers to subject access within a 10 minute interval (to simulate a676
scaled measure of prolonged change).677
For example, violation empDBShortRead and violation empDBLongRead678
classifies malicious behaviour as any subject successfully requesting access to679
invoke the ‘read’ action on empDB, at a greater rate than a max allowable.680
A constraint is applied to the violation, whereby this violation only applies681








(subAttribute <> 〈permisRole, SysAdmin〉)
For violations empDBShortModify and empDBLongModify, malicious be-683
haviour is classified in terms of any subject successfully requesting access to684
invoke the ‘modify’ action on empDB, at a greater rate than a max allow-685
able. As with the aforementioned violations, a constraint is applied meaning686









(subAttribute <> 〈permisRole, SysAdmin〉)
Violation empDBShortDelete classifies malicious behaviour in a subject689





Violation lgTShortAccess classifies malicious behaviour of subjects691
rapidly accessing the lgT (logistic tool) resource.692
lgTShortAccess = (subAccessReqRatelgT >
MaxAccessReqFastRatelgT)
Violation empDBTransaction is slightly different, whereby it classifies a693
transaction of non-conventional change. This type of violation denotes a694
pattern whereby a rate of transactional requests are compared against a695
maximum rate. The violation requires an environment property that mea-696
sures the rate of access requests, by a subject, in performing a read action697
succeeded by a modify action against empDB. Basically, it aims to identify698




A final violation, albeit by contrast does not capture subject activity700
directly, is dueRedundancy. This violation is a consequence of a change701
made within the empDB resource, indicating that a subject has been marked702
for job redundancy. A subject facing the prospect of redundancy is seen703
as a potential risk, and as such, a violation is used to increase the impact a704
subject has on an organisation. This is viewed as a motivator for adaptation,705
as when combined with previously identified violations, the subject’s activity706
may now warrant adaptation.707
dueRedundancy = (subDueRedundancy == true)
4.7. Identifying Change Types and Change708
To stimulate violations within the context of the LGZLogistics case study,709
it is necessary to identify properties of interest and the change types that710
will impact such properties. For this specific case study, only environment711
properties are considered. These are properties that concern subject activity712
that cannot be directly controlled (e.g., a subject’s rate of access requests).713
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4.7.1. Environment Properties714
For each violation, and for each subject, there exists a set of environment715
properties that measure the extent of change in the environment. Many envi-716
ronment properties represent composite properties of subject-related changes717
over time. In reference to SAAF, these properties are dynamically created718
as mutable attributes within SAAF’s behaviour model, and updated through719
the observation of environment change via probes.720
For example, empDBShortRead asserts that if a subject’s access rate721
in requesting a read on empDB (who is not a SysAdmin) goes be-722
yond a maximum number of requests within a minute interval, a vi-723
olation has occurred. To measure against this violation, an environ-724
ment property of as.subject.AcessReqRateempDB.read is required (e.g.,725
as.emp0003.AccessReqRateempDB.read).726
4.7.2. Change Types and Changes727
Once environment properties are identified it is necessary to select rele-728
vant change types (and changes) that result in a non-conventional operational729
state. For example, a non-conventional operational profile that contains730
the violation empDBShortRead is realised through a succession of changes,731
whereby a single subject successfully requests access to ‘read’ empDB. The732
violation occurs when a subject, e.g., emp0003, has performed a number733
of Access request change type, and is permitted by an Access decision734
change type.735
The Access request change type is the result of a number of sequential736
changes, such as the subject first authenticating with their identity provider,737
requesting a release of attributes as credentials, and validation of attributes.738
In this instance, these changes need to be realised before a subject performs739
an Access request change type.740
All but one violation described for the LGZLogistics case study is trig-741
gered by an Access request change type. The violation dueRedundancy742
is triggered by a Resource action step change, whereby an environment743
property for a given subject indicates a subject is due for job redundancy744
(e.g., empDB.emp0003.isSetForRedundancy).745
4.8. Malicious Changeload746
Using the LGZLogistics malicious behaviour scenario, the following set747
of change scenarios are defined. Together they represent the malicious748
changeload for the case study. There are seven change scenarios defined749
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within the malicious changeload, representative of the case study’s malicious750
behaviour scenario, and each change scenario is applicable to the base sce-751
nario.752
The first change scenario (setSubjectRedundanciesChangeScenario) consid-753
ers a set of resource changes relevant to empDB, where changes identify four754




state, Gf , CsetRedundancies)
CsetRedundancies = {
c1 = (resource action step type, empDB,
〈emp0003.Redundancy〉,
〈emp0003.Redundancy = true〉, 0, 0)
c2 = (resource action step type, empDB,
〈emp0004.Redundancy〉,
〈emp0004.Redundancy = true〉, 0, 0)
c3 = (resource action step type, empDB, ,
〈emp0005.Redundancy〉,
〈emp0005.Redundancy = true〉, 0, 0)
c4 = (resource action step type, empDB,
〈emp0006.Redundancy〉,
〈emp0006.Redundancy = true〉, 0, 0)}
The second scenario (emp0003ReadModifyChangeScenario) describes a756
malicious change scenario resulting in violations empDBLongReadModify,757
empDBLongRead, and empDBLongModify, whereby subject emp0003 persis-758
tently reads and modifies records in the empDB resource, every four seconds.759
An arbitrary function δ is defined in order to calculate the time at which a760
change is executed within the change scenario (for each scenario, we assume761
a different function δ). For the following change scenario, δ is defined as762
δ(n) = 1
2





state, Gf , CmaliciousTransactions)
CmaliciousTransactions = {
c1 = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉, 〈event〉, 3, 0)
c2 = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
modify, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉, 〈event〉, 4, 0)
. . .
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cn = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉, 〈event〉, δ(n), 0)
cn+1 = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, empDB,
modify, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉,
〈event〉, δ(n+ 1), 0)}
The third scenario (con0002FastReadChangeScenario) describes a malicious765
change scenario by subject con0002, resulting in violations empDBShortRead766
and empDBLongRead. In this scenario, a contractor supervisor persistently767
accesses the empDB resource at a rate of 2 seconds, in order to obtain em-768
ployee data. The scenario begins 150 seconds relative to the start of mali-769
cious changeload. The function δ denotes the progression in time (seconds)770




state, Gf , Ccon0002FastRead)
Ccon0003FastRead = {
c1 = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, ContractorSupervisor〉〉,
empDB, read, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉,
〈event〉, 150, 0)
. . .
cn = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, ContractorSupervisor〉〉,
empDB,modify, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉,
〈event〉, δ(n), 0)}
For contractors con0003, con0004, and con0005, similar change scenarios772
exist based on con0002FastReadChangeScenario. However, the scenarios are773
introduced in stages of 30 second intervals (i.e., con0003 begins at 3 minutes774
from the start of the malicious changeload, con0004 begins at 3.5minutes,775
etc.). The rate of changes is defined as δ(n) = 2.5n, where subjects utilise776
their 〈permisRole, Contractor〉 attribute, in accessing empDB.777
Lastly, emp0003FastAccessChangeScenario describes a further malicious778
change scenario by emp0003, resulting in violation lgTShortAccess. In this779
scenario, emp0003 persistently requests access every 370ms and gains access780
to lgT resource (logisticsTool resource), to disrupt the performance of the781
resource. The scenario begins 900 seconds relative to the start of malicious782
changeload. δ denotes a function whereby progression in time (seconds) is783





state, Gf , Cemp0003FastAccess)
Cemp0003FastAccess = {
c1 = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, Staff〉〉, lgT,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉,
〈event〉, 900, 0)
. . .
cn = (access request type, as,
〈request(〈〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉〉, lgT,
read, 〈NULL〉, pid = emp0003)〉,
〈event〉, δ(n), 0)}
This malicious changeload (consisting of the seven change scenarios) con-785
cisely describes the LGZLogistics malicious behaviour scenario. It is the786
intention that the changeload can be repeated under various operational787
conditions, and also used to compare future approaches to self-adaptive au-788
thorisation. As such, it can be exploited to execute simulation of changes789
within an authorisation infrastructure, in order to evaluate the impact of790
violations, and trigger self-adaptive responses. However, one limitation is791
that no parser currently exists to execute a defined changeload. Therefore, a792
changeload can only be viewed as a model of change, which must be manually793
transformed into an executable script (e.g., JMeter simulation scripts).794
5. Experiments795
The LGZLogistics case study is simulated within a live self-adaptive au-796
thorisation infrastructure. This self-adaptive authorisation infrastructure is797
instantiated across four individual machines. Two machines running Debian798
Linux (512MB of memory) are deployed hosting an LDAP directory and an799
installation of SimpleSAMLphp [37]. These are configured to operate as800
the lgzIS and conIS identity services, respectively. A single machine running801
Ubuntu Linux (2048MB of memory) is deployed hosting an installation of802
the PERMIS standalone service, instantiating authorisation service as, and803
a prototype of the SAAF controller. Lastly, a single ‘client’ machine run-804
ning Windows (2048MB) is deployed to simulate activity between subjects805
accessing a resource, and communicating with services of the authorisation806
infrastructure.807
The rest of this section details a brief overview of the deployment of808
the prototype of the SAAF controller, a description of how the malicious809
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changeload is simulated within the environment, the execution of experi-810
ments, and lastly, a summary of results.811
5.1. Deploying the SAAF Controller812
For the LGZLogistics case study, SAAF is deployed as a federated autho-813
risation infrastructure in order to facilitate the adaptation process.814
Figure 7 portrays LGZLogistic’s federated authorisation infrastructure,815
based on the architectural model described in Section 2.1. Here, the in-816
frastructure is distributed across multiple management domains (identity817
provider and service provider domains). LGZLogistics operates a service818
provider domain (to handle authorisation and provision access to resources),819
and their own identity provider domain (to handle identity management of820
their own employees). In addition, the contractor organisation is said to op-821
erate their own identity provider domain (to handle identity management of822
their own employees).823
Figure 7: Self-adaptive federated authorisation infrastructure
SimpleSAMLphp [37] is used as the enabling technology to facilitate824
communication between these management domains. It provides a layer825
of control over ‘what’ information can be released or requested (in regards826
to subjects), and how subjects can be authenticated. Deployments of Sim-827
pleSAMLphp are capable of exchanging information via signed or unsigned828
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SAML assertions [33], such as messages containing a set of subject attributes829
and the subject’s unique identifier.830
A prototype of the SAAF controller is deployed within LGZLogistics ser-831
vice provider domain, whereby it is expected to manage authorisation as-832
sets across both management domains. However, self-adaptation over multi-833
ple management domains is a challenging and non-trivial problem. Identity834
providers often do not release uniquely identifiable personal information to835
service providers, and use transient (TID) or persistent (PID) IDs to allow836
service providers to identify subjects. In addition, identity providers may not837
be as forthcoming to accepting adaptations from an organisation outside of838
their management domain, meaning the SAAF controller can only ‘request’839
adaptation.840
A solution to enabling adaptation across multiple management domains841
is the deployment of an effector managed by the identity provider domain [5].842
Here an effector can map a service provider’s view of a subject (i.e., from a843
subject TID / PID to subject LDAP entry), and govern which adaptations844
to perform. Instantiations of this effector are deployed on each of the iden-845
tity services (subject identity adaptation), as well as an effector capable of846
deploying and activating policies within the PERMIS authorisation service847
(policy adaptation).848
A resource probe is deployed on the empDB resource to observe changes849
to the state of an employee’s job redundancy property (resource change). In850
addition, a probe is deployed on the PERMIS authorisation service to detect851
access change and policy change. A probe is not deployed on the contractor’s852
identity service (conIS) simulating a limitation in federated authorisation in-853
frastructures, where third party organisations may prevent immediate access854
to their subject’s attributes (subject change). This limits the SAAF proto-855
type’s view of the state of access, whereby the SAAF prototype must infer856
its perception of subjects from the observation of access requests (via the857
authorisation service as).858
The SAAF controller is configured to detect and mitigate the set of viola-859
tions described in Section 4.6. Here, a solution policy exists containing a set860
of solutions applicable to mitigating instances of these violations. Each solu-861
tion contains a weighting of cost to the deploying organisation (e.g., the cost862
in removing subject access, or removing the trust in an identity provider). A863
minimum subject impact weighting, on a scale of 0 to 1, is also defined, which864
is used to constrain a subset of solutions relevant to resolving differing scales865
of malicious subject behaviour. These weightings are used as part of solution866
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analysis and solution selection. The following solutions are configured for867
this deployment:868
• S0 - noAdaptation default solution for when all other solutions cause greater im-869
pact over an observed behaviour;870
• S1 - removeSubjectAttribute removal of an individual abused attribute from a871
subject (i.e., the cause of a violation);872
• S2 - removeAllSubjectAttributes removal of all attributes from a subject, typ-873
ical for when subjects are persistently abusing access;874
• S3 - removeAttributeAssignment removal of trust in an identity provider in is-875
suing valid attributes (policy change);876
• S4 - removeAllAttributeAssignments removal of all trust in an identity provider877
in issuing valid attributes (policy change);878
• S5 - deactivatePolicy removal of all access to all of LGZLogistic’s resources.879
A limitation in this deployment is the inability to use the integrated880
rbacDSML tool3, preventing solution verification from taking place. This is881
due to the fact that our deployment operates within a federated environment882
that conforms to ABAC, which rbacDSML is unable to accommodate for. It883
was decided that evaluating SAAF within a federated environment provided884
greater contributions as opposed to enhancing rbacDSML to operate within885
a federated ABAC environment [6]. As a consequence, we assume all adap-886
tation solutions result in acceptable implementations of the access control887
model.888
5.2. Executing LGZLogistics Changeload889
The execution of the LGZLogistics malicious changeload (Section 4.8) is890
achieved through enacting environment change via a number of protocols:891
• LDAP binds [25] - for authenticating subjects within identity providers;892
• SAML assertions [33] - for requesting and deliverance of released at-893
tributes as signed credentials (to and from identity provider services);894
3rbacDSML allows the verification of RBAC access control models, enabling organisa-
tions to manage their access control models with greater accuracy, efficiency, and assur-
ance [29].
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• SOAP messages [9] - for credential validation requests, credential val-895
idation responses, access requests, and access decisions (to and from896
protected resources and authorisation services).897
An installation of the JMeter testing tool [2] (deployed on the Windows898
‘client’ machine) automates each of the change types applicable to an autho-899
risation infrastructure, using the aforementioned protocols. Here, subjects900
are simulated in authenticating, requesting, and obtaining access to protected901
resources.902
Using the experimentation profile proposed by Cámara et al. [12], the903
malicious changeload is executed across multiple runs as part of four experi-904
ments. The two experiments are designed to evaluate the SAAF prototype.905
Exp1 and Exp2 evaluate the prototype in mitigating malicious changeload906
under normal and high loads, respectively.907
Figure 8: Executing changeload experimentation profile [12]
Each experiment is executed six times (referred to as ‘runs’), where each908
run follows the set of stages stated in Figure 8. The stages of a run are:909
1. steady state time - the realisation of a base scenario for the LGZLogis-910
tics case study that portrays the authorisation infrastructure and its911
expected system properties, and environment properties, for a typical912
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work day. Steady state time is maintained for a period of 30 minutes in913
order to ensure the controller and authorisation infrastructure is eval-914
uated in a warmed up state. During this time, the baseline scenario is915
simulated within the authorisation infrastructure;916
2. environment stimulation - the execution of the malicious changeload.917
From this period on there is a set of staggered violations in which sev-918
eral periods of ‘time to react’ and ‘time to adapt’ overlap environment919
stimulation. This is necessary in order to evaluate the prototype’s abil-920
ity to detect and mitigate multiple attacks that have been conducted921
collaboratively;922
3. time to react - the detection of malicious behaviour and decision to act;923
4. time to adapt - time it takes to perform adaptations;924
5. keep time - time needed to observe system recovery post adaptation.925
In this post adaptation the baseline scenario resumes and no further926
adaptation takes place.927
6. check time - the post analysis of each run. It remains the same for each928
run within an experiment.929
At the end of each run the system and environment states are reset before930
performing the next run. For consistency, each run (and experiment) observes931
the same steady state, malicious changeload, and keep / check time.932
5.3. Experiments Execution933
Experiments Exp1 and Exp2 demonstrate adaptation under increasing934
loads on the controller (in terms of processing environment change).935
5.3.1. Baseline execution936
Baseline runs identify the impact of the malicious changeload whereby no937
adaptation takes place. During these runs, the prototype controller is active,938
yet limited to only detecting the number and types of violations that have939
occurred.940
Figure 9 (i) and (ii) describe the rate of access of key subjects within the941
LGZLogistics authorisation infrastructure (taken at minute intervals). Note942
that ‘all.Staff’ indicates an aggregate rate for all subjects with attribute943
〈permisRole, staff〉, whereas, all others represent the access requests of an944
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Figure 9: (i) Baseline Exp1 normal load, (ii) baseline Exp2 high load
individual. Figure 9 (i) depicts execution of malicious changeload under945
normal load, simulated as the continuation of the base scenario through-946
out environment stimulation. Figure 9 (ii) depicts execution of malicious947
changeload under high load, simulated as an increase to the base scenario’s948
‘staff’ rate of access, from 20req/min to 600req/min.949
The normal load baseline (i) is representative of a baseline run for Exp1950
and Exp2 since the experiments undergo the same steady state and malicious951
changeload scenarios for their corresponding runs.952
Comparing the baseline runs portrayed minimal difference in violations953
observed. Point A indicates the start of the malicious changeload (1800954
seconds into the run), where the setSubjectRedundancies change scenario is955
executed, sending the controller several resource change events. It also indi-956
cates the start of emp0003ReadModify change scenario, at point B, where a957
system analyst begins to persistently read and modify records in empDB at958
a rate of 15req/min. At point C a contractor supervisor (con0002FastRead)959
begins to persistently read the empDB resource at a rate of 33req/min. This960
is followed by D, where three contractors also begin malicious behaviour,961
exhibiting a slightly lower request rate of 24req/min. Lastly, at point E,962
emp0003FastAccess change scenario is stimulated, representing a system an-963
alyst attempting to disrupt the performance of resource lgT, accessing at a964
rate of 160req/min.965
The only exception between the two baselines is indicated at point F966
(high load baseline). As a result of the client machine being pushed to its967
limits (overloaded by emp0003FastAccess), a slowdown in load occurred after968
3000 seconds into the run. Whilst this presented an anomaly to the baseline,969
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adaptation runs were not impacted, as shown in Figure 10.970
Regarding the detection of malicious behaviour, the controller detected971
275 violations in normal load (i), and 260 violations in high load (ii). These972
were confined to six types of violations: dueRedundancy, empDBTransaction,973
empDBShortRead, empLongRead, lgTShortAccess, empLongModify. The974
high load baseline had fewer detections due to the slowdown of client re-975
quests at 3000 seconds into the run.976
5.3.2. Adaptation execution977
Experiments Exp1 and Exp2 undergo the same malicious changeload as978
the baseline execution, albeit against a normal and high load, respectively.979
The experiments and results to be discussed in the following take as a basis980
Figure 10 and Table 1.981
Figure 10: (i) Exp1 normal load, (ii) Exp2 high load
Both experiments resulted in the consistent identification and selection of982
solutions to violations, where 14 attack steps were identified and responded983
to. Table 1 details these attack steps, where each step describes:984
• A malicious subject who has carried out a violation;985
• The calculated impact of the subject to the organisation;986
• The violation observed;987
• A set of identified solutions in which to mitigate the violation;988
• The selected solution used to mitigate the violation;989
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Step Subject Impact Violation Identified Selected RTime ATime Result
Solutions Solutions (Avg, Std) (Avg, Std)
1 emp03 0.07 dueRedundancy S0 S0 4.6, 0.5 N/A N/A
2 emp04 0.07 dueRedundancy S0 S0 2, 0 N/A N/A
3 emp05 0.07 dueRedundancy S0 S0 2, 0 N/A N/A
4 emp06 0.07 dueRedundancy S0 S0 1.8, 0.4 N/A N/A
5 emp03 0.4 empDBTransaction S1 S1 291.6, 59.6 182.2, 48.6 1
6 con02 0.07 empShortRead S0 S0 1.4, 0.5 N/A N/A
7 con02 0.27 empShortRead S1 S1 186.6, 77.5 153.4, 22 1
8 con03 0.07 empShortRead S0 S0 2.4, 1.1 N/A N/A
9 con04 0.07 empShortRead S0 S0 1.6, 0.5 N/A N/A
10 con03 0.27 empShortRead S1 S1 94.8, 33.8 165.2, 63.2 1
11 con05 0.07 empShortRead S0 S0 4.6, 2.8 N/A N/A
12 con04 0.27 empShortRead S1 S1 139.8, 23.1 146.2, 38.9 1
13 con05 0.27 empShortRead S1 S1 70.2, 9.7 120.4, 27.7 1
14 emp03 0.8 lgTShortAccess S2,S3,S4,S5 S2 297.8, 35.8 189.4, 63.8 1
Table 1: Exp1: Adaptation with normal load (time in milliseconds)
• The response time (RT ime) in which to select the solution;990
• The time to carry out an adaptation AT ime;991
• The result as to whether a solution was successful (1), failed (0), or not992
applicable (i.e., no adaptation performed).993
Reviewing Table 1, steps 1 to 4 identify a resource change event (at994
point A), which triggered the violation dueRedundancy. For each subject, an995
impact level was calculated based on past behaviour observed. The controller996
calculated a low impact for these subjects (0.07), as none of these subjects997
have any previous violations. However, the result of this means that the998
controller is less tolerable to future violations.999
Step 5 portrays the controller’s first adaptation in response to subject1000
emp0003 triggering a second violation (empDBTransaction at point B). As a1001
result, the subject’s impact level was recalculated from 0.07 to 0.4. Solution1002
S1 was identified (as being within scope of the subject’s level of impact),1003
and realised in the form of an adapted ABAC model (whereby the subject’s1004
〈permisRole, SysAnalyst〉 attribute is removed). The adapted ABAC model1005
was then assessed by the controller’s planning stage, ensuring the identified1006
solution does not cause a greater cost to the organisation over observed vi-1007
olations. As the solution only impacts the malicious subject, and no other1008
solution is applicable to the impact of the subject, solution S1 is selected.1009
Solution S1 is enacted as a SOAP message [5] sent to the subject’s rele-1010
vant identity provider (lgzIS) effector. The effector accepts the request and1011
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removes emp0003’s SysAnalyst attribute. The consequence of this adapta-1012
tion is that emp0003 is no longer able to gain future access to empDB, as1013
the employee lacks the necessary access rights.1014
In steps 6 to 13, the contractor supervisor (con0002 ) and three other1015
contractors are detected at points C and D respectively, triggering violation1016
empDBShortRead. Detection results in a similar process to that of the first1017
attack by emp0003 (step 5), where each subject’s impact is recalculated1018
and appropriate solutions are identified and enacted. Eventually, each con-1019
tractor’s relevant attributes in accessing the empDB resource are identified1020
and removed via a SOAP message sent to the contractor’s identity provider1021
(conIS) effector.1022
In the final step, emp0003 rapidly accesses the lgT resource, this time1023
using their remaining attribute 〈permisRole, Staff〉. This triggered the1024
violation lgTShortAccess, whereby the controller calculates the subject’s1025
impact level as 0.8. Several solutions are now applicable given this impact1026
weighting, including solutions that result in policy adaptation. However, as1027
the subject has been identified as the source of two previous violations, but1028
is the only subject that has abused their permisRole attribute of SysAnalyst1029
and Staff, solution S2 is enacted. This results in the complete removal of1030
access for subject emp0003.1031
As a result of subject identity adaptation, malicious behaviour by subjects1032
were mitigated given the abuse of access rights. Moreover, subject identity1033
adaptation ensured that non-malicious subjects remained able to request and1034
gain access to protected resources, as evident by the rate of access maintained1035
for all.staff, as shown in Figure 10.1036
5.4. Summary of Results1037
In the experiments performed, adaptation resulted in preventing the de-1038
tected malicious subject(s) from gaining further access. This was achieved1039
through removing the abused access right (assigned attribute), removing all1040
of a subject’s access rights at identity provider level, or removing varying1041
degrees in trust of the contractor identity provider.1042
In Exp1 and Exp2, no impact was made to authorisation services in terms1043
of the service being able to perform its duties. This reflects the fundamental1044
design of SAAF, which promotes separation of concerns between adaptation1045
and authorisation. In these experiments, the impact on identity provider1046
services was negligible. There was no observable rise in latency in subject1047
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authentication and attribute release as a result of identity provider adapta-1048
tion. However, malicious subjects were impacted at identity provider level,1049
in terms of attribute removal, yet this was the desired consequence of adap-1050
tation.1051
Further experiments have been performed using different malicious1052
changeloads that trigger other self-adaptive strategies for mitigating mali-1053
cious behaviour [7], and all of them have demonstrated the effectiveness of1054
the SAAF prototype in handling the violations identified in the malicious1055
changeloads.1056
5.4.1. Subject Identity versus Policy Adaptation1057
The experiments portray scenarios that exemplify subject identity adap-1058
tation and policy adaptation. A scenario where a controller is capable of1059
performing subject identity adaptation against all identity providers, and a1060
scenario where the controller is limited in performing subject identity adap-1061
tation (requiring policy adaptation).1062
Subject identity adaptation is seen as the economical choice, whereby1063
malicious behaviour can be mitigated with no impact to non-malicious sub-1064
jects. When subject identity adaptation was possible, the malicious subjects’1065
behaviour was mitigated almost immediately, preventing future violations.1066
However, where subject identity adaptation was not possible, subjects were1067
capable of repeating violations until the controller identified that the cost of1068
unresolved violations warranted policy adaptation.1069
Policy adaptation has far greater consequence in comparison to subject1070
identity adaptation, which is calculated (in part) by the number of non-1071
malicious subjects that will lose access to resources as a result of an adapta-1072
tion.1073
Regardless of type, each adaptation results in a concrete adjustments to1074
the authorisation infrastructure. Adaptations ultimately control the outcome1075
of future access decisions, and whether or not subjects can be authorised in1076
accessing resources.1077
5.4.2. Performance1078
Whilst benchmarking the performance is not the main objective for this1079
paper, the performance observed in the experiments requires some explana-1080
tion. Of particular interest is the performance of different types of adapta-1081
tion. Performance is directly related to the number of violations the controller1082
can identify, the size of its access control model, the number of previously1083
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identified violations, the number of solutions applicable to an identified vi-1084
olation, and the type of adaptation to be performed. For each experiment,1085
these factors remained persistent, relative to the given experiment step.1086
A concern was the high standard deviation observed (max 99ms) between1087
experiment runs for some adaptations, specifically in regards to the time it1088
took the controller to react and decide upon solutions. Steady state time was1089
used to place the controller in a warmed up state. However, due to a mix of1090
factors the standard deviation failed to improve. Some of these factors in-1091
clude network fluctuation between communication of the prototype controller1092
and its effectors, the triggering of Java garbage collection and Java’s code1093
optimisation, and that the controller prototype is yet to be optimised. To1094
compensate for this, further experiment runs are required, but were limited1095
to 6 runs per experiment (due to the hour long run-time of each run).1096
6. Discussion1097
The LGZLogistics case study has provided a scenario for demonstrating1098
and evaluating the detection and mitigation a malicious changeload. This1099
has been achieve through self-adaptation in the context of a federated envi-1100
ronment consisting of multiple management domains. Probes and effectors1101
have shown to facilitate automated adaptation across these management do-1102
mains, where there is arguably a greater need for automation given the fact1103
that federations contain large and unknown user bases.1104
6.1. Evaluation Approach1105
The experiment was designed to demonstrate the resilience of the SAAF1106
prototype in mitigating malicious behaviour under repeatable conditions.1107
This required simulating a predefined malicious changeload for triggering self-1108
adaptation, and capture the mitigating responses from the SAAF prototype.1109
The evaluation of SAAF prototype was performed using a simulation1110
of a large scale deployment, akin to a small to medium sized organisation.1111
This was critical to providing evidence of the SAAF prototype’s feasibility in1112
operating within the real world, and that the prototype would consistently1113
mitigate violations in a resilient manner. As such, it was observed that the1114
SAAF prototype was capable of mitigating violations when operating under1115
high loads, and when faced with non-cooperating management domains.1116
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6.2. Detection and Adaptation1117
The goal of this paper was not to improve existing techniques for detec-1118
tion malicious behaviour, rather, to demonstrate a new process for handling1119
insider threat. With that said, detection within the SAAF prototype is worth1120
discussing. The SAAF prototype uses detectors to identify known types of1121
attacks, typically focused on thresholds, which is a common approach in1122
detection of malicious behaviour [17, 41].1123
Adopting a threshold approach for detecting malicious behaviour has the1124
advantage of clearly identifying extremes in user behaviour These rules are1125
then incorporated into rules defined by experts, knowledgeable in the differ-1126
ences between normal and abnormal behaviour. However, if a rule is incorrect1127
or inappropriate for the current state of the system, there is the potential1128
for many false positives. Clearly a challenge for SAAF is to employ detec-1129
tion techniques that can evolve and accommodate such legitimate changes in1130
behaviour.1131
In SAAF, the decision whether to adapt uses cost sensitive modelling [39]1132
to assess subject impact and impact of solutions. This approach has al-1133
lowed the aggregation of multiple violations before enacting the appropriate1134
solution. Multiple occurrences of violations arguably strengthens the per-1135
ception in the subject being malicious4, as well as adjudicating the extent of1136
appropriate adaptation. Lastly, through this approach, the organisation in1137
which the SAAF prototype is being deployed has the ability to fine tune the1138
enactment of the alternative solutions, in terms of their costs.1139
In the experiments discussed, the SAAF prototype considers the metric1140
of rate of access requests as the primary environment property in identifying1141
malicious behaviour. Whilst using this metric has shown to be successful1142
in identifying attacks, for it to be efficient, the level of access control must1143
be fine grained. In addition, a subject’s ability to access a resource should1144
be determined by short term (or one time use) credentials issued by their1145
identity provider.1146
The experiments demonstrated the selection and escalation of solutions1147
in response to detected violations. Whilst this was successful and ultimately1148
viewed as enacting ‘appropriate’ solutions to violations, the cost sensitive1149
modelling approach employed has several limitations. One of the limitation1150
4One exception to this is if the behaviour rules specified are incorrect, which is addressed
as part of SAAF’s limitations.
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is the fact the approach relies upon weighting solutions by a perceived cost1151
of negative impact to an organisation, which is then compared to a perceived1152
cost of subject activity. Although not observed within the experiment it-1153
self, there is potential for multiple solutions in conjunction with observed1154
behaviour to present identical costs (i.e., benefits) to an organisation.1155
One issue that was not addressed in the experiments is the presence of1156
bottlenecks. Given this implementation of SAAF is a prototype, a notable1157
deficiency in its design is its inability to consider multiple violations during1158
a single iteration of its feedback loop. If violations are detected during the1159
prototype’s current analysis of behaviour, multiple violations are queued,1160
analysed, planned and executed in a sequential manner. This may result in1161
an increase of the response times when mitigating behaviour identified in the1162
aforementioned manner, due to failed or redundant adaptations if a previous1163
adaptation has already resolved the violation.1164
6.3. Threats to Validity1165
This paper has presented the resilience evaluation of the Self-adaptive1166
Authorisation Framework (SAAF) prototype in handling and mitigating ma-1167
licious behaviour by simulating a case study related to insider threats. How-1168
ever, there are assumptions that may affect the validity of the results.1169
Regarding internal validity, there is the nature of using case studies and1170
simulation. Specifically, simulation presents a certain amount of bias whereby1171
the violations performed are known, and the prototype controller can be con-1172
figured in an optimum way to best handle such violations. This is the case1173
in the deployment of the SAAF prototype in which the specification of the1174
malicious changeload and the development of SAAF was done by the same1175
person. Therefore, the simulation approach can only be seen as a means to1176
demonstrate the prototype’s resilience in handling known violations. What1177
we have not evaluated is how the prototype handles unknown malicious be-1178
haviour, and in particular, unpredictable changes that might violate known1179
behavioural patterns. In our understanding, the key threat to validity are1180
the unknown malicious behaviour, and not so much whether a third party1181
should be responsible for the specification of either SAAF or the malicious1182
changeload. Since unpredictable changes are challenging to simulate, it is1183
vital to evaluate SAAF in a live environment in which real users carry out1184
malicious behaviour. This has been done [8], and that study complements the1185
outcomes of this paper that uses case studies, and simulation of a malicious1186
changeload.1187
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Another threat to internal validity is related to the parameters adopted1188
for the definition of scenarios, malicious changeloads and violations (see sec-1189
tions 4.5 and 4.6). In this paper, these were selected in order to stimulate1190
the SAAF prototype under normal and high load conditions. However, since1191
there are no clear indicators how these should be selected because it depends1192
on several factors, such as, application domain and deployment environment,1193
the key criterion adopted for the selection of these parameters was to max-1194
imise stress conditions when evaluating the resilience of the SAAF prototype.1195
Regarding external validity, although we have identified the mali-1196
cious changeload for a specific case study, the general model of malicious1197
changeload, briefly presented in Section 4, could be easily instantiated into1198
different case studies. However, the major challenge would be related to the1199
deployment of SAAF prototype on a new environment, and this could in-1200
troduce new vulnerabilities at the level of probes and effectors, for example.1201
Moreover, changeload does not consider potential attacks to the infrastruc-1202
ture in which the SAAF prototype is deployed. Since the defined changeload1203
is restricted to activities related to access control policies and their enforce-1204
ment, direct attacks to the deployment infrastructure were not considered1205
because they are outside the scope of the study. For these changes to be1206
considered, a new changeload definition is required.1207
While several validity threats exist, the results obtained have shown the1208
value of using a simulation of a malicious changeload when evaluating the1209
resilience of self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures.1210
7. Related Work1211
In this section, we present related work on self-protecting systems, and1212
on how resilience benchmarking provides a practical way for characterising1213
and comparing self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures.1214
Self-protecting systems are a specialisation of self-adaptive systems with a1215
goal to mitigating malicious behaviour, and as such, the SAAF prototype can1216
be considered a self-protecting system. In the following, we discuss few of the1217
works that have demonstrated self-protection within the context of mitigating1218
insider attacks. In particular, we discuss two self-protection approaches based1219
on the state of access control, and one approach based on the state system1220
architecture.1221
One of the approaches to self-protection via access control is Securi-1222
TAS [35]. SecuriTAS is a tool that enables dynamic decisions in awarding1223
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access, which is based on a perceived state of the system and its environ-1224
ment. SecuriTAS is similar to dynamic access control approaches, such as1225
RADac [28], in that it has a notion of risk (threat) to resources, and changes1226
in threat leads to a change in access control decisions. However, it furthers1227
the concepts in RADac to include the notion of utility. The main difference1228
between SecuriTAS and SAAF, is that SecuriTAS authorisation infrastruc-1229
ture incorporates self-adaptation by design, and it is based on its own be-1230
spoke access control model. SAAF, on the other hand, is a framework that1231
describes how existing access control models, like ABAC, and legacy autho-1232
risation infrastructures, like PERMIS [15, 16], can be made self-adaptive, so1233
that it can be configured to actively mitigate insider threat. With that said,1234
both approaches demonstrate an authorisation infrastructure’s resilience in1235
mitigating insider attacks, by ensuring that authorisation remains relevant1236
to system and environment states (and preventing continuation of attacks by1237
adaptation of security controls).1238
In contrast to self-protection via access control, architectural-based self-1239
protection (ABSP) [43] presents a general solution to detection and miti-1240
gation of security threats via run-time structural adaptation. Rather than1241
reason at the contextual layer of ‘access control’, ABSP uses an architectural1242
model of the running system to identify the extent of impact of identified1243
attacks. Once attacks or security threats have been assessed, a self-adaptive1244
architectural manager (Rainbow [19]) is used to perform adaptations to1245
mitigate the attack. ABSP shares a number of similarities with intrusion1246
response and prevention systems, particularly, with the scope of adaptations1247
that ABSP can perform (e.g., structural adaptation against network devices1248
and connections). However, because ABSP maintains a notion of ‘self’, it is1249
able to reason about the impact of adaptations and provide assurance over1250
adaptation before adapting its target system.1251
Another similar example of self-protection is one proposed by Morin et1252
al., which takes a novel approach in managing access control, through the use1253
of architectural adaptation [31]. When access control policies are changed,1254
the architectural model is updated, resulting in the running system being1255
reconfigured through adaptation. Morin et al.’s approach shows the effec-1256
tive deployment of access control across an entire system, where unlike a top1257
down approach proposed by XACML, there is no centralised point of failure.1258
A limitation in this approach is that this form of architectural adaptation is1259
expensive, requiring all resources that need access control to be engineered1260
in a particular manner, lowering the usefulness of the approach in industry.1261
46
In addition, it lacks the ability to automatically evolve and reflect changes1262
to access control, once malicious behaviour has occurred. However, the tech-1263
nique poses a novel and viable means of realising a change to access control,1264
once such a change has been formulated.1265
Although there has been several publications on self-adaptive security [40,1266
42], there are few contributions on how these systems should mitigate in a1267
dynamic way cyber attacks, and in particular, insider threats. However, some1268
of the existing work complements the work of SAAF by providing means1269
in order to manage access control policies [21], and looking into selection of1270
policies based on risk [18]. On other hand, there is similar work to ours, whose1271
goal is to enabling legacy systems to incorporate dynamic security policies,1272
which in the case of Al-Ali et al. is by adapting the system architecture [1].1273
Compared to other established benchmarks (see Section 2.3), a resilience1274
benchmark can be specified following the same generic principles of bench-1275
marking, but changeload needs to be revised and expanded, and should1276
support a risk-based approach for evaluating by comparison the adaptation1277
mechanisms of a self-adaptive software system [12]. An example of such1278
changeload is the one applied to the resilience evaluation of an architectural-1279
based self-adaptive system [11]. In this paper, we have tailored the original1280
changeload model [12] to the context of self-adaptive authorisation infras-1281
tructures and focusing on insider threats. There is no other work, to be1282
best of our knowledge, that has attempted to evaluate the resilience of self-1283
protecting system in a systematic way, not even providing a generic frame-1284
work that could be instantiated into a wide range of systems.1285
8. Conclusions1286
This paper presented an approach for the resilience evaluation of self-1287
adaptive authorisation infrastructures. For demonstrating the overall ap-1288
proach for handling and mitigating malicious behaviour, we have defined a fic-1289
titious case study of insider threat, defined a repeatable malicious changeload,1290
and deployed a Self-Adaptive Authorisation Framework (SAAF) prototype.1291
Changes on the operational conditions included: changes to the run-time load1292
of the authorisation infrastructure, changes to the autonomic controller, and1293
changes in the availability of probes and effectors.1294
The evaluation demonstrated that SAAF was resilient in handling abuse1295
in access control under repeatable conditions, and that SAAF consistently1296
mitigated abuse under normal and high loads. In addition, when faced with1297
47
restrictions in enacting adaptation, SAAF was able to escalate its selection of1298
policy adaptation in order to overcome failures in subject identity adaptation.1299
It was shown that, whilst subject identity adaptation created minimal impact1300
on non-malicious subjects, it was authorisation policy adaptation that was1301
effective in halting abuse of access. Finally, the experiments based on SAAF1302
prototype have also demonstrated its effectiveness in mitigating abuse of1303
access control in federated environments.1304
Several limitations could be associated with the proposed approach. In1305
the security domain, case studies, compared with real systems, are not able1306
to achieve the same level of coverage regarding the range of attacks the sys-1307
tem may encounter. On the other hand, the use of case studies and malicious1308
changeload are fundamental for obtaining the repetitive conditions necessary1309
for evaluating the resilience of a self-adaptive system. However, in order to1310
balance out this limitation, we have demonstrated the resilience of SAAF in1311
the context of a honeypot based deployment that made use of a game [8]. An-1312
other limitation when evaluating the resilience of self-adaptive authorisation1313
infrastructures using use cases is the inability of dealing with a wide range1314
of changes that are representative of unexpected subject behaviour. This1315
may include, for example, subjects changing their behaviour when reacting1316
to self-adaptation. This has confirmed that simulation does not consider the1317
run-time consequences of mitigation based on self-adaptation.1318
As future work, the plan is to use mutation when specifying a malicious1319
changeload in order to uncover vulnerabilities that are particular to certain1320
deployments of self-adaptive authorisation infrastructures.1321
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[10] Cámara, J., Correia, P., de Lemos, R., Vieira, M., 2014. Empirical1366
resilience evaluation of an architecture-based self-adaptive software sys-1367
tem, in: Proceedings of the 10th International ACM Sigsoft Confer-1368
ence on Quality of Software Architectures, ACM, New York, NY, USA.1369
pp. 63–72. URL: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2602576.2602577,1370
doi:10.1145/2602576.2602577.1371
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